israel, iran relations

 

In May 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu defeated Peres on an anti-Oslo platform. Though Israel initially supported Iran, it came to appreciate the way the war absorbed Arab resources and prevented the Arabs from focusing on the Palestinian issue. Gradually, as the shah gained further power and expanded his ties with Washington, in conjunction with the enticing Iranian oil income and lucrative development plans, Israel had even better reasons to cultivate ties with Persia. Intimate cooperation between the security agencies developed and economic ties rocketed forward (Gilboa, pp. Moreover, Persia’s Islamic stance has placed the Arab-Israeli conflict on a different footing, projecting it rather as a religious crusade than merely a political-national conflict. In March 1949 Persia sent an unofficial envoy, ʿAbbās Ṣayqal, without official invitation or formal portfolio, to manage these claims. Depuis plus de quarante ans, l’Iran, Israël et les États-Unis s’affrontent à distance dans une guerre larvée. Maḥmud Wāʿeẓi, for-mer Deputy Foreign Minister, Tehran, 16 August 2004. Cet incident n'est que le dernier épisode en date de la guerre larvée que se livrent la République islamique et l'État hébreu. So Rabin played [the Iranian threat] more than it was deserved in order to sell the peace process” (Interview, Jerusalem, 19 October 2004). Prior to Israel’s independence, Persian policy toward a Jewish state was unfavorable. Rather than strengthening and reinforcing the image of Israel’s invincible deterrence, the war that was to weaken Iran only made Israel itself more vulnerable. During the 1948 war, Persia showed tacit solidarity with the Arab states, but proved reluctant to involve itself in combat. On 6 March, 1950 while the Majlis was in New Year recess, the government recognized Israel de facto, without formal announcement. Histoire des relations israélo-libanaises. Reuter, 7 March 1996 and 8 April 1996. As Iran began to realize the implications of Israel’s New Middle East, it reassessed its long-standing position of avoiding direct confrontation with Israel. In the past, Turkey's ties with Israel have caused various disagreements between Ankara and Tehran. The strategic value of Israel for Persia in meeting the challenges of internal subversion and regional aggression further encouraged the cultivation of closer economic ties as well as security and intelligence cooperation since the late 1950s. Houchang Chehabi, Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanan in the Last 500 Years, New York, 2006. A picture shows Israeli air strikes in the Gaza Strip, controlled by the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas, on May 10. Economic cooperation continued, and Persia offered agricultural products in exchange for the importation of industrial goods, medical equipment, and for additional technical assistance. In fact, Israel inadvertently handed Iran its only success in exporting its revolution in the Arab world by invading Lebanon. Israel, on the other hand, had its continued alliance with the United States to thank for its avoidance of complete isolation. Relations between Israel and Iran further deteriorated after Iran deployed 1,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) troops to the Beqaa valley in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. On 7 March Enteẓām informed Abba Eban of the recognition (Hagana Archives, 14/13A; Hacham, p. 95). R. K. Ramazani, “Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” The Middle East Journal, 1978. "But talking, trying to take down tensions, trying to see if there's a modus vivendi, trying to get countries to take actions on things they're doing that you don't like—that's good, that's positive. Israel’s vision of the new Middle East order came at the expense of Iran since Yitzhak Rabin believed that the Israeli population would be unlikely to accept peace with the Arabs unless a greater and more ominous threat, namely Iran and Islamic fundamentalism, was looming in the horizon. Aḥmadi-nežād’s rhetorical excesses are a throwback to the Ayatollah Khomeini era. David Menashri, Trita Parsi, “ISRAEL i. Les liens de proximité et d’amitié entre les deux pays se sont détériorés au point de se muer en hostilité irréconciliable. Tehran badly needed progress in exporting its revolution. ), and the emergence of a pro-Iranian Shiʿite leadership in Iraq, the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, America’s unpopularity in the region, the Arab governments’ perceived inability to act independently of Washington or oppose its policies, America’s perceived inability to push back Iran militarily, and Tehran’s unhindered march towards a nuclear capability all served to strengthen Iran’s position in the region and increase Israel’s strategic vulnerability. This article is available in print.Vol. China-Iran: Bad news, but it could be worse for Israel - analysis China would also receive a major discount on Iranian oil and become a near monopsony, as long as sanctions on Iran remain. The defeat of Iraq and the collapse of the Soviet Union evaporated Iran and Israel’s common threats and improved their security environments, but it also left both of them unchecked. ), in which Israel lobbied the United States to arm Iran in its war efforts against Saddam Hussein in order to achieve a “broader strategic relationship with Iran” (Segev, p. 249). The close ties between the two countries under the last shah reinforced such perceptions. In 1947, serving on the UN Special Committee for Palestine, Persia was one of the three states that voted against Palestine’s partition, favoring a federal solution. Following the fall of Moṣaddeq government through the coup d’état of 1953 (q.v. Since the emergence of the Zionist movement in the late 19th century, Persia’s attitude has been ambivalent, if not hostile, to the idea of Jewish statehood. U. Hacham, “Iranian-Israeli Relations in the Years 1947-1957,” M.A. After some initial successes, the Israelis were stunned at Hezbollah’s powerful response, including its firing of thousands of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. Two days later, Deputy Defense Minister Zippori announced that Israel would provide military aid to Iran if it changed its hostile approach to the Jewish state (Associated Press, 28 September 1980). Labor’s landslide victory, the Arabs’ military weakness, and the PLO’s near-collapse led the Labor Party to conclude that Israel’s long-term security would be better served by befriending the Arab states of Israel’s vicinity, instead of the non-Arab states in its periphery. And Iran was radical Islam. Publié le 21/02/2021. Such an order must, by definition, be all-inclusive and reflect the reining geopolitical balance. In fact, Israel had been planning for war against Hezbollah for more than two years. Exclusion and confrontation. On 24 July 1960, the shah reiterated publicly his country’s recognition of Israel. In addition, Israel’s invasion had been immensely destructive and only adding to the misery of Lebanese who had already been suffering from seven years of civil war. The new realities were seen as a golden opportunity for Israel, to promote its economic interests and strategic schemes. Submitted tags will be reviewed by site administrator before it is posted online.If you enter several tags, separate with commas. At the second level, it should involve the Arab states neighboring Israel, and only at the third level should it involve Iran. ), and stress the good will Israel has shown toward Persian nationals in Israel. Dans la marine, l'Iran dépasse Israël pour le nombre de navires de combat, mais lui cède en matière de qualité. While the intent to befriend Persia existed prior to independence, it intensified in the late 1950s when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion coined the “periphery concept.” It prescribed that in the absence of relations with its neighbors, Israel should seek the friendship of “the neighbors of the neighbors.” This was translated into a close, though informal, alliance with Persia (Gilad, 2002, p. 252; Gilboa, p. 257; Welāyati, 2001, pp. Iran is the secret matchmaker in Israeli-Arab relations - opinion Despite their own propaganda and rhetoric, the secular Arab regimes long ago figured out … In the words of an AIPAC representative, “Blaming the Iranians for Palestinian terrorism would be counterproductive to his message that terror was coming from the Palestinians” (Interview, AIPAC representative, 25 March 2004). B. Gilad, “Paras,” Ha-Miazrah ha-Hadash 4/4, 1953. 101-6). The shah also believed that through relations with Israel, Persia would benefit in the United States, gaining the support of American Jewry, the congress, media, business community, and the administration. À LIRE AUSSI Israël-Iran, l'autre guerre en Syrie. Eshaq Emran Shaoul, “Cultural Values and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Iran: The Case of Iran’s Recognition of Israel,” Ph.D. ʿAbd-al-Nāṣer responded with harsh criticism, breaking all diplomatic ties with Persia (to be restored only in 1970). On 1 October 1994, the Persian Gulf states announced their support for a review of the Arab boycott, abolishing the secondary and tertiary boycotts against Israel. Nader Entessar, “Israel and Iran’s National Security,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 27/4, Summer 2004. Unconfirmed reports claim that Israeli military advisors even visited the Iranian frontline to evaluate Iran’s capabilities and needs. Ce second volet débute avec la conférence de Madrid et la volonté des États-Unis de pacifier les relations entre Israël et ses voisins du Moyen-Orient. of 1955 also provided him with the sense of security that he needed to pursue his regional goals. It's not a new thing. These common interests will remain valid” (Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 December 1986). This was at the heart of Peres’ vision of the “New Middle East,” which had little room for Iranian prominence. A detente policy with Iran would have far-reaching implications for the chances for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.”. In 1949 Israel’s foreign ministry asked the head of its UN mission, Abba Ebban, to initiate talks with the Persian ambassador, Naṣr-Allāh Enteẓām (q.v. Iran continued to be viewed as a non-threat due to its lack of offensive capabilities. All (261) Vladimir Putin (90) Iran (82) Iran nuclear deal (64) Israel-Russia relations (61) Israel - Relations With Iran, (December 15, 2007) by David Menashri Article link. Israeli airstrikes and shelling have hit an estimated 130 positions suspected to belong to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, including sites used for rocket launches, weapons manufacturing, intelligence gathering and a tunnel used to infiltrate beneath the fortified security fence separating the coastal enclave from Israel, according to the IDF, which said early Tuesday it had killed "15 terrorists" in the process. During the 1948 war, some Persian residents of Palestine fled the country and their properties, like those of the Arabs who had left, were put under government custody. The operation came amid a spike in unrest surrounding an attempt to evict Palestinian families living in the neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah. Thus, Khomeini preferred a cold peace with Israel, in which it opposed the Jewish state at the rhetorical level without translating that rhetoric into operational policy. Netanyahu and the Likud Party were ideologically opposed to the Oslo process and did not conceal their mistrust of the Palestinians. Initially just a small number of armed groups of young men organized under the banner of Islam and dedicated to fighting the Israeli occupation, over time they banded together into what has proved to be one of Israel’s most formidable foes, the Lebanese Hezbollah. Paul J. The Israeli accounts were confirmed by the Islamic Republic’s News Agency (IRNA), which reported that the Likud was seeking to settle its political issues with Tehran through the assistance of Iranian Jews (IRNA, 24 July 1996). Balancing between continued warfare (Israel’s preferred outcome at the time) and an Iraqi victory was an imprecise science. ); and according to Keith Weissman of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), “it’s not an unreasonable assertion that the Iranians understood that by electing Netanyahu, you would slow-down the peace process. That's another question," Blinken said at the time. Robert B. Reppa, Israel and Iran: Bilateral Relations and Effect on the Indian Ocean Basin, New York, 1974. The relationship between Israel and Iran has since the very inception of the Jewish state in 1948 been a complex function of Iran’s geo-strategic imperatives as a non-Arab, non-Sunni state in an overwhelmingly Arab and Sunni environment, and its need to find an appropriate relationship with its Arab/Sunni neighbors in order to materialize Iranian regional leadership aspirations. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel’s former foreign minister, argued that “the question today is not when Iran will have nuclear power, but how to integrate it into a policy of regional stability before it obtains such power. Labor, however, needed a scapegoat” (Interview, 26 February 2004). Zarif "reaffirmed Iran's solidarity with the oppressed people of Palestine, and condemned the usurping and brutish Zionist regime's measures against the fasting people of Palestine as well as its attack against Al-Aqsa Mosque and martyring and wounding defenceless worshippers. Hamas' relationships across the Arab World are more complex, however. Ben-Gurion described relations between Persia and Israel then as friendly, informal, “but not hidden,” and based on “mutual benefit” (Gilad, 2002, pp. Thus Arab audiences knew the names of Israeli casualties and where they had been killed well before the Israeli army had a chance to inform the soldiers’ families. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, whose group has twice fought cross-border wars with Israel, suggested during a speech last Friday that Israel was "terrified" of recent regional developments, including the Iran-Saudi negotiations, which he said were "in the interest of the Axis of Resistance. David Menashri, an Israeli expert on Israeli-Iranian relation, said that “in the back of the historical memory of the Israelis, when you speak about Iran, Iran is considered to be a good friend of Israel.” (Sterling, 2012) These good … Israel, then seeking legitimacy in the Middle East, viewed Persia an ideal ally. In addition, the eruption of the second Intifada in 2000 and the deterioration of the situation in the Palestinian territories were met by a lowering of Iran’s profile on the Palestinian issue. Daily news headlines & detailed briefings enjoyed by half a million readers. ʿAli Fallāḥ-nežād, Monasabāt-e Irān wa Esrāʾil dar dawra-e Pahlavi-e Dovvom, Tehran, 1982. Israel’s strength and progress fascinated him, and its conflict with the Arab world and opposition to Communist influence in the region further promoted the strengthening of ties. The opening of the Tiran Straits turned Eilat into a natural route for importing oil to Israel and later to Europe. Israel launched deadly airstrikes on Gaza in response to a barrage of rockets fired by Hamas amid spiraling violence sparked by unrest at Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque compound and a dispute over housing rights in the neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah. So there were a lot of attempts during the first year after the Revolution, to see if we could revive the relations with [Iran]” (Interview, Tel Aviv, 22 October, 2004). The Islamic Revolution. In addition, Iran had since 1976 experienced a relative decline, fueled by the rise of Iraqi power. Relations of Turkey and Iran with Israel. Out of these dealings that supported Iran in this new phase, Israel aimed at improving its relationship with Iran, on the grounds that Iraq was a serious military power and a greater threat, while hoping that the new regime in Iran would reconsider its relationship with Israel and recognize the benefit of mutual interest. 68-74; Fallāḥ-nežād, pp. ", According to the statement, the Saudi Foreign Ministry "reaffirms that the Kingdom stands with the Palestinian people, and supports all efforts aimed at ending the occupation and reaching a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue, enabling the Palestinian people to establish their independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with international resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative. The Ḵātami government hoped that its constructive cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq would pave the way for a new chapter in U.S.-Iran relations. The effect of the decrease in the tension on Tehran’s perception of the peace process was crystallized one year later when Iran’s new president, Moḥammad Ḵātami, reinstated the policy of accepting any deal agreeable to the Palestinians, including a two-state solution (Interview, Ambassador Nežād-Ḥosayniān, Tehran, 12 August, 2004). Relations Iran - Israël - USA: nouvelle donne. On April 10, an explosion rocked the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran—the most recent salvo in a long-running shadow war between the Islamic Republic and the forces seeking to prevent it from reaching the military nuclear threshold. Save any major shift in the balance of power in the Middle East, the geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Israel is likely to endure regardless of the ideological predispositions of the Iranian leadership, though a change in the nature of the regime in Tehran may cause the manifestation of this rivalry to vary significantly. Eventually, however, Ḵātami’s efforts were hampered by his inability to improve relations with the United States, which in turn prevented Iran from gaining recognition for its rising power and moderated foreign policy. Azerbaijan and Israel have engaged in close cooperation since 1992. Tel Aviv was very concerned about Baghdad’s rise and looked toward Iran as a potential partner to contain Saddam’s ambitions (Alpher, p. 155). Even so, their relations gradually developed into what one Persian official described it to me as “relations of love without a marriage contract.”. Par AFP et Times of Israel Staff. Tehran began translating its anti-Israeli ideology into operational policy in order to undermine the American-Israeli push for the new Israel-centric Middle East by attacking its weakest link, the peace process. Meir Ezri, a Persian native, was sent by the Israeli foreign ministry to Tehran in 1958 and remained there as minister and ambassador until 1973 (Ezri, pp. The Republican Push to Ban Critical Race Theory Reveals an Ugly Truth. Israel's home airbases are a long flight from Iran. In their view, not only was Peres’ vision of the New Middle East inherently flawed, his strategy of demonizing Iran was also contrary to Israel’s national interest in the sense that it significantly reduced the possibility of reviving the Iranian-Israeli entente, which the Likud viewed as next to inevitable in case of a failure to reach an accord with the Palestinians. Israel-Iran Relations: A Native Poet's Perspective Poet Roya Hakakian is both Iranian and Jewish, and in an op-ed in Sunday's New York Times, she argues that the two nations share an … The “liberation” of Jerusalem would remain an ideal to be used in Iran’s rhetoric to win legitimacy in the Arab world, but not to be operationalized for its own purposes. After 1967, with ʿAbd-al-Nāṣer considerably weakened and incapable of conducting subversive activities, the shah was able to expand ties with Israel with less anxiety and with the support of Unites States. The relationship between the U.S. and Iran has long been defined by mutual hostility, and both have accused one another of sponsoring terrorism. In the years 1958-67, while Israel helped develop Persia’s armed forces, Persia accelerated its sale of crude oil to Israel. While Persia’s national interests and the last shah’s pro-Western tendencies have led to a somewhat tolerant approach, as a Muslim state influenced heavily by the ulama, hostile attitudes remained prevalent. Early contact, 1948-63. Hamid Algar, Berkeley, 1981. Hamas and fellow Gaza-based group Palestinian Islamic Jihad have launched a barrage of what the Israel Defense Forces estimated to be at least 300 rockets so far targeting Israeli cities and settlements in response to an IDF raid on Jerusalem's revered Al-Aqsa Mosque. Through these groups, Iran could bring the war to Israeli territory, a scenario that further accentuated Israel’s vulnerability to asymmetric warfare. Radicalzation of Iranian government. David Menashri, “Reflections on the Immigration of Iranian Jews to Israel,” The History of Contemporary Iranian Jews, Los Angeles, 1997, pp. À LIRE AUSSI Israël-Iran, l'autre guerre en Syrie. It later sided again with the Arab states (11 May 1949) voting against Israel’s admission to the United Nations. The Gaza-based Palestinian Ministry of Health has so far reported at least 22 Palestinians killed, including nine children, a claim that Conricus said the force was investigating but could not corroborate. Though military and intelligence cooperation with Israel has at times been seen as necessary to advance Iran’s geo-strategic goals primarily the balancing of threats emanating from Iran’s Arab neighbors ties to the Jewish state has impeded the attainment of Iran’s second goal; that of achieving long-term security by befriending the Arab/Sunni states in its immediate neighborhood and gaining legitimacy for Iran’s quest for supremacy. Idem, Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-63, London, 1988. The shah’s quest to legitimize Iran’s hegemony through American backing, strong ties and military aid to the regions moderate Arab government, and financial aid to the more radical Arab states, combined with public distancing from Israel, ultimately failed to persuade the Arabs to grant Iran the role it aspired. By 1997, Iran announced the production of Šahāb-3 ballistic missiles, which would put Israel within Iran’s reach. "Hamas was hoping to gain strength in the West Bank, and they couldn't do it because the election was postponed," the Israeli official said. This strategy reflected the new geo-strategic realities.